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ABSTRACT 
The classical Debreu-Scarf core equivalence theorem asserts that in an exchange 
economy with a finite number of agents art allocation (under certain conditions) is 
a Walrasian equilibrium if and only if it belongs to the core of every replica of the 
exchange economy. The pioneering work of P. Samuelson has shown that such a 
result fails to be true in exchange economies with a countable number of agents. 
This paper presents a Debreu-Scarf type core equivalence theorem for the over­
lapping generations (OLG) model. Specifically, the notion of a short-term core al­
location for the overlapping generations model is introduced and it is shown that 
(under some appropriate conditions) an OLG model allocation is a Walrasian equi­
librium if and only if it belongs to the short-term core of every replica of the OLG 
economy. 
AN OV ERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL 
CORE EQUIVALENCE THEOREM* 
Charalamhos D. Aliprantis and Owen Burkinshaw 
We show that in the overlapping generations model an allocation is a Walrasian 
equilibrium if and only if the allocation belongs to the short-term core of every repli­
cation of the economy-and hence, we establish a core equivalence theorem for the 
overlapping generations model. 
1. INTRODUCTION
In their classic paper G. Debreu and H. E. Scarf [13] established that an alloca­
tion in an exchange economy with a finite number of agents and a finite dimensional 
commodity space is a Walrasian equilibrium if and only if it belongs to the core of 
every n-fold replica of the economy. The Debreu-Scarf theorem was extended to 
exchange economies and economies with production having a finite number of agents 
and iru-9.nitely many commodities by C. D.  Aliprantis, D.  J. Brown and 0. Burkin­
shaw in [l] and [2]. However, the Debreu-Scarf theorem fails to be true in exchange 
economies with a countable number of agents, as was first observed by P. Samuelson 
in his pioneering paper on the Consumption Loan Model [19]. For in the overlapping 
generations (OLG) model not every competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. In 
this work, we search for the analogue of the Debreu-Scarf theorem in the overlap­
ping generations model. We establish that in the overlapping generations model an 
allocation is a Walrasian equilibrium if and only if it belongs to the short-term core 
of every replica of the overlapping generations model. This result is new even for 
overlapping generations models with finite dimensional commodity spaces. 
* We thank D. J. Brown and an anonymous referee for their constructive comments on an earlier 
version of this paper. Research of both authors was su pported in part by a Chrysler Corporation 
grant to IUPUI. The article in its present form will appear in the Journal of Economic Theory. 
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For economies with a finite dimensional commodity space, versions of the first 
and second welfare theorems were established by G.  Debreu in [12] and were ex­
tended to economies with an infinite dimensional commodity space by A. Mas-Colell 
[18], C. D .  Aliprantis and 0. Burkinshaw [8] and M. A. Khan and R. Vohra [15].
The first and second welfare theorems dealing with Pareto optimality in the overlap­
ping generations model were studied by Y .  Balasko and K. Shell [9, 10] under the 
assumption that agents' consumption sets lie in a finite dimensional space and their 
preferences are given by smooth functions. Balasko and Shell were able to prove ana­
logues of both the first and second welfare theorems by using a notion of optimality 
which is weaker than Pareto optimality. We shall refer to this optimality concept 
as short-term optimality. Short-term optimality was studied by C. D .  Aliprantis, 
D .  J. Brown and 0. Burkinshaw in [4]; the monograph [5] contains more about this
optimality notion. As mentioned above, we shall also introduce a core notion for 
the overlapping generations model which we shall refer to as the short-term core of 
the overlapping generations model. J. Esteban in [14] characterized the Walrasian 
equilibria that are core allocations and gave an example where the sets of Walrasian 
equilibria and core allocations are not equal. In an OLG model with a continuum 
of agents, S. Chae [11] showed that an allocation is a Walrasian equilibrium exactly 
when it cannot be improved upon by any coalition in the short-term and thus he 
established a core equivalence theorem for a continuum of agents. 
In sum: We address the reiationship between the welfare and market mecha­
nisms in the overlapping generations model with an infinite dimensional space of 
commodities. In particular, we are interested in what sense competitive equilibria 
in overlapping generations models over an infinite dimensional commodity space are 
related to the core of the economy-in short, we are interested in formulating a 
core equivalence theorem for the overlapping generations model in analogy with the 
Debreu-Scarf theorem. The main results of the paper are Theorems 4.2 and 5.1 
which characterize the Walrasian equilibria in an overlapping generations model in 
terms of the short-term core. 
2. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
This paper will utilize the theory of Riesz spaces. For detail accounts of the 
theory of Riesz spaces see the books [6, 7, 16, 20, 2 3]. A few basic facts about Riesz 
spaces are briefly discussed below. 
A Riesz space is a partially ordered (real) vector space which is in addition 
a lattice, i.e. , with the extra property that finite sets have suprema (least upper 
bounds) and infima (greatest lower bounds). The supremum and infimum of two 
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elements x and y will be denoted by x Vy and x /I y, respectively. That is, 
xVy=sup{x, y} and x/ly=inf{x, y}. 
If x is an element in a Riesz space, then the elements 
x+ :=xVO, x- :=(-x)VO and lxl :=xV(-x),
are referred to as the positive part, the negative part and the absolute value of x, 
respectively. 
For the rest of the discussion in this section the letter E will denote a Riesz 
space. The positive cone of E will be denoted by E+, i.e.,
E+ = { x EE: x:::: 0 }.
A vector subspace A of E is said to be an ideal whenever !YI ::; !xi and x E A 
imply y E A. Every element x belongs to a smallest ideal A,, called the principal
ideal generated by x. We have 
Ax= { y EE: There exists>.> 0 with !YI ::0 >.!xi}.
The II · !loo-norm on Ax is the lattice norm defined by 
II Y !loo= inf{ A> 0: !YI ::0 .Alxl}, Y E Ax.
Under the 11·1100-norm, Ax is a normed lattice (in fact, an M-space with unit). The
norm dual of (Ax, 11·1100) will be designated by A�. More generally, every non-empty 
subset A of E is contained in a smallest ideal, called the ideal generated by A. The 
ideal A enjoys some remarkable algebraic and topological properties that will be 
employed in our study. For details regarding the properties of the ideal A we refer 
the reader to [3]. 
The sets of the form [x, y] := { z E E: x ::; z ::; y }, where x ::; y, are called 
the order intervals of E. A linear functional f: E ---+ R is said to be order bounded
whenever f carries order intervals onto bounded subsets R. The vector space of all 
order bounded linear functionals on E is called the order dual of E and is denoted 
by E-. Under the ordering f ::=:: g whenever f(x) ::=:: g(x) for each x EE+, the order
dual E- is a Dedekind complete Riesz space. 
The commodity-price duality in our economic model will be described by a Riesz 
dual system. A Riesz dual system (E, E') is a Riesz space E together with an ideal 
E' of E- that separates the points of E such that the duality is the natural one, i.e., 
(x, x') = x'(x) holds for all x EE and all x' EE'. We will assume that each Riesz 
space E is equipped with a locally convex-solid topology that is consistent with the 
dual system (E, E'); see [6, 7]. 
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3. THE OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL
In the overlapping generations model the index t will denote the time period. 
The commodity-price duality at period t will be represented by a Riesz dual system 
(Et, Ei). Consequently, we have a sequence ( (E1,E;),(E2,E�), .. . ) of Riesz dual
systems each member of which designates the commodity-price duality at the corre­
sponding time period. Note that we allow a ( possibly) different commodity space at 
each time period in order to accommodate the possibility that future commodities 
may enter the market and old ones may disappear. 
It will be assumed that each consumer has a two-period lifetime. Thus, consumer 
t is born at period t and lives all his life in periods t and t + 1. Each consumer trades 
and has tastes for commodities only during his life-time period. We suppose that 
consumer t gets an initial endowment 0 < w; E Et at period t and 0 < w;+1 E Et+i
at period t + 1 (and, of course, nothing else in any other periods) . Consequently, his 
initial endowment Wt can be represented by the vector 
wt= (o, ... ,o,w;,w;+1,o,o, . . .  ) 
where w; and w;+1 occupy the positions t and t + 1, respectively. Also, we shall 
assume that the "father" of consumer 1 ( i.e., consumer 0) is present in the model at 
period 1. He will be designated as consumer 0 and his endowment will be taken to 
be of the form 
wo = (w5,o,o, ... ) 
with 0 < w6 E El. 
The vectors of the form 
Xt = (0, . . .  , 0, x�, x;+1, 0, 0, . . .  ) ,
where xi E Et and x;+1 E Et.-1 represent the commodity bundles for consumer t
during his life time. Each consumer t maximizes a utility function Ut defined on his
commodity space, i.e. , Ut is a function from Et x Et.-1 into R. The value of Ut at the
commodity bundle Xt = (0, . . .  , 0, x;, x;+1, 0, 0, . . . ) will be denoted by ut(xl, x;+1 ). 
The utility functions will be assumed to satisfy the following properties. 
1. Each Ut is quasi-concave;
2. Eachut is strictly monotone on Et x Et.-u that is, (x,y) > (x1,Y1) inEt xEt.-1
implies ut(x,y) > Ut(x1,Y1); and 
3. Each u, is continuous on Et X Et.-1, where each E, is assumed equipped with
a locally convex-solid topology consistent with the duality (Et, Ei). 
The case t = 0 is a special case. The utility function u0 is a function of one 
variable defined on Et. It is also assumed to satisfy properties (1 ), (2) and ( 3) above.
Xo=(x6,o,o, ... ) and o::;xt= (O, ... ,o,x;,x;+1 ,o,o, . . .  ) for t�l,
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is said to be an allocation whenever xJ_1 + xl = wJ_1 + wl holds for all t = 1, 2, . . .(or equivalently, whenever z:::: 0x, = z:::: 0w,). 
A price in the overlapping generations model is any sequence p = (p1 ,p2, ... ),
where p' E E; for eact t-the vector p' should be interpreted as representing the 
prevailing prices at period t. 
Definition 3.1. A non-zero price p = (p1 ,p2, • • •  ) is said to support an allocation
(x,) whenever
a) x <::o xi; in Ei implies p1 · x 2': p1 ·xi;; and 
b) (x,y) <::t (xi,x;+1 ) in Et X Ei+.1 implies p' ·x +pt+l. y 2'.p' ·xl+p'+1 · x;+1
for all t 2': 1. 
It should be noted that if a price p = (p1,p2, • • • ) supports a given allocation 
(xo,x1,x2, ... ), then x <:t x, implies p · x 2': p · x, for all t = 0, 1,2, . . . . The
definition of a Walrasian equilibrium in the overlapping generations model is as 
follows. 
Definition 3.2. An allocation (x,) is said to be a Walrasian equilibrium for
the overlapping generations model whenever it can be supported by a non-zero price 
p = (p1, p2, • • •  ) such that
a) p1 ·xi; = p1 ·wl;; and
b) p' ·xi+ pt+1 · x;+1 = p' · wi + p<+1 · vJ;+1 for t 2': 1.
As mentioned above, each Riesz space E, is assumed equipped with a locally
convex-solid topology consistent with the Riesz dual system (E,, E;). We shall de­
note by r the product topology of the product Riesz space E1 x E2 x · · · . If E 
denotes the ideal of E1 x E2 x · · · consisting of all sequences that vanish eventually, 
i.e., if 
E={(x1 ,x2, . • . )EE1xE2x···: 3 ksuch that x;= O for all i>k} ,
then it turns out that the topological dual of (E, r) is precisely the product Riesz
space 
E' = E; x E� x · · ·. 
The details are included in our next result-whose straightforward proof is omitted. 
Theorem 3.3. The topological dual of (E, r) is
E' = E; x E� x · · · , 
where the duality between E and E' is given by
00 
p. x = 2:Pt. Xt,
t=l 
for all x = (x1,x2, ... ) EE and all p = (p1,p2, ... ) EE'.
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It should be immediate from the above discussion that the OLG model defines a 
pure exchange economy with a countable number of agents {O, 1, 2, . . .  } whose com­
modity price duality is described by the Riesz dual system (E, E'). This exchange 
economy will be referred to simply as the OLG economy. 
An important case for the overlapping generations model is when the commodity 
space at each period is the ideal generated by the total endowment of that period. 
The total endowment present at period t is given by the vector 
The ideal generated by Bt in E, will be denoted by 8,. That is, 
8, = { x E Et: There exists ,\ > 0 with lxl ::0 ,\81}.
The ideal 8, under the norm llxll00 = inf{,\ > 0: lxl :::; >.e, } is an M-space with
unit. As usual, the norm dual of (8i, 11 · 1100) will be denoted by 0;. We shall need
to consider the overlapping generations model when the commodity price duality at 
each period is given by the Riesz dual pair (8,, 0;). Thus, a price for this OLG 
model is any sequence of the form 
p=(p
1
,p
2
, ... ) ,
where 0 :0: p' E 8i for each t.
We shall denote by 0 the ideal of 81 x 82 x · · · consisting of all sequences 
having a finite number of non-zero coordinates, i.e. , 
0 = {(x1,x2, ... ) E 81 X 82 X · · · : :J k such that x; = 0 for all i > k}.
By Theorem 3. 3, we know that if each 0, is equipped with the II · lloo-norm and T 
denotes the product topology of 81 X 82 X • · -, then the topological dual of ( 0, T) 
is the Riesz space 
e' = 0� x 0� x . . .
and the duality of the Riesz dual system (e, 01) is given by 
00 
p·x= LP'·x,,
t=l 
for all x=(x1,x2, . . .  )E8 and all p=(p1,p2, . . .  )E0'.
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4. A CORE EQUIVALENCE THEOREM
In this section we shall study decentralization properties of allocations for the 
OLG model. A coalition S is any non-empty set of consumers and may be a finite 
or an infinite set. We start with a definition. 
Definition 4.1. An allocation (x,) is said to be:
1) Short-term optimal, whenever there is no allocation (y,) satisfying
a) I::o Yt = I::o w,;
b) Yt = x, for all but a finite number of t;
c) Yt tt x, for all t; and
d) Yt >-t x, for at least one t .
2) An allocation (x,) is said to be in the short-term core, whenever there is no
coalition S and no assignment {y,: t E S} of consumption bundles satisfying
a) LtEsYt=LtESw,;
b) y t = x, for all but a finite number of t E S;
c) Yt tt x, for all t E S; and
d) Yt >-t Xt for at least one t in S.
The notion of short-term optimality is referred to as weak Pareto optimality 
by Y. Balasko and K. Sheli in [9]. In their work Y. Balasko and K. Shell presented 
interesting necessary and sufficient conditions for an allocation to be short-term opti­
mal; see [9] and [5] for a complete discussion of the concept of short-term optimality. 
Before studying short-term core allocations, we need to consider the replica of an 
economy with commodity-price duality (E,, E;). The n-fold replica OLG economy 
is a new economy having a countable number of agents {O, 1, 2, ... } x {1, 2, . . .  , n} 
such that 
1) each agent (i, k) is of type i, i.e., the agent (i, k) has the same characteristics
as agent i in the original OLG economy; and
2) The commodity-price duality of this new OLG economy is described by the Riesz
dual system (E, E1).
We now come to the main objective of this section; namely, to state and prove
a core equivalence theorem in the overlapping generations model. We shall first 
derive this result when the overlapping generations model has the Riesz dual system 
( 0, 01) • This theorem will then be generalized in the next section. 
Theorem 4.2. An allocation for the overlapping generations model is a Walrasian
equilibrium with respect to the Riesz dual system (0, 01) if and only if it belongs to 
the short-term core of every n-fold replica of the OLG economy. 
The proof of this theorem will be accomplished by a series of lemmas. For 
the proof we shall construct a sequence of prices that support the given allocation 
"locally. " A limit of such a sequence will allow us to obtain a price that supports 
the allocation. 
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Throughout the proof we shall let (x,) be a fixed allocation that belongs to the 
short-term core of every n-fold replica of the overlapping generations economy. We 
need to show that (x1) is a Walrasian equilibrium. Our first goal is to establish that 
this allocation admits sequences of prices that support a finite number of consumers. 
Lemma 4.3. Let (x1) be an allocation that belongs to the short-term core of every
replica of the OLG economy. For each positive integer n there exists a price
such that 
- ( 1 2 n n+l 0 0 0 ) E 0'p p,p, ... ,p ,p ' ' ' , 
.
. .  
a) p1 E 0; for each 1 :S: t :S: n + 1;
b) p · x, = p·w1 > 0 for each 1 ::; t ::; n; and
c) x E 0 and x �t Xt for some 0 :S: t :S: n implies p · x :::0: p·w, .
Proof. Let I = Ab denote the ideal generated in E by b = :z::::;!01 Xt • If follows
that the first n + 2 coordinates of b are non-zero and all coordinates greater than 
n + 2 are zero. Clearly,
I = 81 x 82 x ... x 8n+1 x nn+2 x 0 x 0 x ... ,
where 0 = { 0} and nn+2 denotes the ideal generated by x�t� in En+z·
- * - 0 < < . * �n+1 vn F v= Let w1 = Wt tor _ t _ n and wn+l = .Lt=O Xt -L;t=O w,. rom L..t=O Wt= 
:z:::::,0 x,, it follows that 0 :S: :z::::;=O Wt :S: :z::::;!01 Xt and so w�+1 :::0: 0 holds. Also, for
each 0 :S: t :S: n + 1 consider the non-empty convex sets
F, = {x E 1+: x �t x1} and Gt= F, -w; .
Let G be the convex hull of LJ�!01 G;. If K = Int(I+) with respect to the 11 · ll=­
norm of I ,  then K is a non-empty cone of I, and we claim that G n (-K) = 0. 
To see this, assume by way of contradiction that G n (-K) # 0. Then there exist
Zt E Ft and At 2 0 (t = 0, 1, . . . , n + 1) with :z::::;!01At= 1  such that
n+l 
L >.1(z1 -w;) E -K. 
t=O 
Since each >., can be approximated by rational numbers, an easy argument shows 
that there exist positive integers mt (t = 0, 1, ... , n + 1) and m such that
n+l 
L':'::(z,-w;)E-K. 
t=O 
It follows that 
n+l 
Lmt(Zt-w;) E -K. 
t=O 
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Therefore, there exists some 0 < f E K such that
n+l 
L mt(Zt -w;) = -f.
t=O 
Rearranging the terms, gives 
n+l n+l 
L mtw; = L mt ( Zt + 
t=O t=O 
i r) (n+2)m, · 
Clearly, Zt C::t Xt and Zt+ (n+�)m, f > Xt for 0::; t::; n+l. Thus, Zt+ (n+�)m, f �t 
Xt holds for each 0 ::; t ::; n + 1. Now let Yt = z, + (n+�)m, f for 0 ::; t ::; n + 1 and
Yt = Xt fort ::0: n + 2. Thus, we have
From (1 ) , we see that 
n+I n+I 
L mtYt = L mtw;. 
t=O t=O 
(1) 
n+l oo n n+1 n oo 
LmtYt+mn+1( L Yt) = LmtWt+mn+i(Lxt-LWt)+mn+1( L Xt) 
t=O t=n+2 t=O t=O t=D t=n+2 
That is, 
n = n 
= Lmtwt+mn+1(Lx,-Lwt) 
t=O t=O t=O 
n oo n 
= L mtWt + mn+l (L Wt -L Wt) 
t=O t=O t=O 
n oo 
= L mtWt + mn+l ( L Wt) 
t=O t=n+l 
n+l oo 
= L mtWt + mn+l ( L Wt). 
t=O t=n+2 
n+I oo 
L ffitYt + mn+l ( L Yt) 
n+I oo 
= Lm,w,+mn+1( L w,). 
t=O t=n+2 t=O t=n+2 
T • + .t 11 t.._ J.. 12 • J.. _ _ _ _ 1 f' • '--- " .,., • � -.i..n v1cvv OJ.. Yt = Xt J.Or a11 uUL a i1111Le 11u1r1oer or i, Yt ct Xt tor a11 t, and Yt >-t Xt tor
at least one t, we see that (x,) is not in the short-term core of the (2::��01 m,) -replica
of the OLG economy. However, this is a contradiction and hence, G n (-K) = 0. 
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Since G and -K are both non-empty convex sets and -K is 11 · ll=-open, it fol­
lows from the Hahn-Banach theorem-see, for example, [7, Theorem 9.10, p. 136]­
that there exists some nonzero price 
( 1 2 n+ 1 n+2 0 0 0 )p = p ,p ' ... ,p , p  ' ' ' ' . . .
with pt E e; for 1 :S t :S n + 1 and pn+2 E !1�+2 such that g E G implies p · g 2'. 0.
Now if x EI and x tt Xt for 0 :S t :S n + 1, then x - w; E G and so
p·(x - w;)  2'. 0. That is, p · x 2'. p·w; holds. Thus, p · xt 2'. p·w; holds for
0 :S t :S n + 1. Since 2:;:� w; = 2:;:01 Xt, it follows that p · x1 = p·w; . Also
Wt = w; for 0 :S t :S n, and so p · xt = p·wt. 
Since the preferences are strictly monotone, it follows that pt � 0 and p·Wt > 0 
for O :; t :S n. Finally, dropping the pn+z term from p, we get that the price
p = (p1,p2, ... ,pn,pn+1, 0,0,0, ... ) satisfies the stated properties. Ill
Our first goal is to establish that there is a sequence of prices (Pn), where
_ ( 1 2 n n+l 0 0 0 ) Pn - Pn,Pn ' · · · ,pn, Pn ' ' ' '· · · '
such that each price Pn "supports the first n consumers." Any such a sequence of
prices will be referred to as a fundamental sequence of prices. 
Definition 4.4. A fundamental sequence of prices for an allocation (xt) is a
sequence of prices (Pn), where Pn = (p;,,p;, ... ,p�,p�+I, 0, 0, 0, ... ) such that:
a) 0 < p� E E>� holds for each k and each n; 
b) Pn · Xt = Pn · Wt for each 0 :S t :S n; and
c) x E 9+ with x tt Xt for some 0 :St :Sn implies Pn·X 2'. Pn·Xt.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 4.3 is that fundamental sequences of prices
always exist. 
Lemma 4.5. Every allocation (xt) that belongs to the short-term core of every
replica of the OL G economy admits a fundamental sequence of prices (Pn) such that
Pn ·Wt> 0 
holds for all n and all t with n 2'. t. 
Proof. Let n be fixed. By Lemma 4.3 there exists a price
such that Pn · Wt > 0 holds for all 0 :S t :S n and x tt x1 in e+ implies
Pn · x 2'. Pn ·Wt. The sequence (Pn) satisfies the desired properties. Ill
The next lemma presents a growth estimate for a fundamental sequence of prices 
and is related to Lemma 4.9 of [4]-and is also the analogue of C. A. \A/ilson's
Lemma 3 in [21]. 
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Lemma 4.6. Let (Pn) be a fundamental sequence of prices for the allocation and
such that Pk · W t > 0 holds for all k and all t with k 2 t. Then for each fixed pair
of non-negative integers R and m there exists some constant M > 0 (depending only
upon R and m) such that 
holds for all k 2 max{ R, m}. 
Proof. Let (Pn) be a fundamental sequence of prices satisfying Pk •W t > 0 for k 2 t.
Let R and m be fixed and suppose by way of contradiction that our claim is not true. 
That is, assume that lim infn>rPn .. wm =0, where r=max{R, m}.- Pn Wt_ 
Let N denote the set of all non-negative integers. Put 
C {. N l" . f Pn·W; o}1 = i E : 1mm --- = n--+oo Pn ·Wt, and C2 = {i EN: lim inf 
Pn·W; > o} .n--+oo Pn ·We 
Clearly, N = C1 U C2, R E  C2 and m E C1. Since N = C1 U C2, there exists two
consecutive integers i and j with j E C1 and i E C2. 
Now the utility function for consumer i is strictly monotone on the two periods 
that consumer i lives and thus, we obtain x; + Wj >-; x;. Since the utility function
u; is continuous, there exists some 0 < /j < 1 with 8x; + Wj >-; x;. Therefore, by the
supportability of Pn, we see that
8pn ·x; + Pn ·Wj 2 Pn · w; 
holds for all sufficiently large n. 
Since Pn ·x; = Pn ·w; holds holds for all sufficiently large n, it follows that
Pn ·wj 2 (1 - 8)pn ·w; holds for all sufficiently large n, and hence
Pn·Wj 2 (l - l))Pn·w;Pn·Wt Pn"W£ 
holds for all sufficiently large n. Consequently, 
1. . f Dn"Wj ( /j) l" . f Pn·W; 1mm -· -- 2 1- imm -- , n--+oo Pn •W£ n---+oo Pn ·Wf, 
which implies lim infn�oo g:::; = 0, contrary to i E C2. The proof of the lemma is
now complete. II 
Now consider a fundamental sequence of prices (Pn), where
_ ( 1 2 n n+I 0 0 0 ) Pn - Pn,Pn'" ·· , pn, Pn ' ' ' , .. · '
for an allocation (xt) = (xo,x1,x2,. .. ). The next lemma tells us that for each k
the set {pn: n 2 k }  is contained in a weak* compact subset of the dual.
Lemma 4. 7. Let (Pn) be a fundamental sequence of prices for an allocation satis­
fying Pn·Wo = 1 and Pn·w; > 0 for n 2 i. Then for each fixed k the set of prices
{p�: n 2 k} is a relatively weak* compact subset of G�.
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Proof. Taking into account that Pn · w0 = 1 for each n, we see by Lemma 4.6 that
holds for each pair ( n, k) with n 2: k. In particular, for n 2: k the set of prices
{p�: n 2: k} forms a norm bounded subset of 0\,, and thus it is a relatively weak*
compact subset of E>!,. • 
We are now ready to complete the proof that the given allocation is a Walrasian 
equilibrium. 
Lemma 4.8. If an allocation belongs to the short-term core of every replica of the 
OLG economy, then the allocation is a Walrasian equilibrium with respect to the 
Riesz dual system (E>, E>'). 
Proof. Let (x,) be an allocation that belongs to the short-term core of every replica
OLG economy. By Lemma 4.5, there exists a fundamental sequence (Pn) of prices
for (x0,x1,x2, . . .  ) such that Pk'Wi > 0 holds for all k 2: i. Replacing each Pk by
_EL_, we can assume that Pk· w0 = 1 holds for all k.Pk·wo 
For each k there exists-by Lemma 4. 7-a closed ball Xk of 0\, with center
at zero such that {p�: n 2: k} � Xk. The closed ball Xk equipped with the w*­
topology of E>\, is a compact topological space. By Tychonoff's classical compactness 
theorem, the product topological space 
is also a compact topological space. If 
then note that Pn E X holds for each n. Let p = (p1, p2, • • •  ) be an accumu­
lation point of the sequence (Pn) in X-it should be noticed that each pk is a
w*-accumulation point of the sequence {p�: n 2: k }. Clearly, p defines a positive
linear functional on E>, i.e. , p E E>'.
Now applying Lemma 4.6 with R = 1, we see that for each fixed m the sequence
of real numbers {Pk ·wm: k = 1, 2, . . .  } is bounded away from zero, and so it follows
that p ·Wm > 0 holds for all m. Now we claim that p supports the allocation (x,) 
on 0. To see this, let some x E e+ satisfy x �t x,. Note that n 2: t implies
Pn'X 2: Pn'Xt = Pn 'Wt · 
It then follows that p · x 2: p · x, = p·w, holds, and therefore (x1) is a Walrasian
equilibrium that is supported on E> by the price p = (p1 ,p2, . • •  ) . m
Finally, we prove the "only if'' part of Theorem 4.2. 
Lemma 4.9. If an allocation ( Xt) for the overlapping generations model is a Wal­
rasian equilibrium with respect to the Riesz dual system ( E>, E>'), then it belongs to
the short-term core of every n-fold replica of the OLG economy. 
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Proof. Let (x,) be a Walrasian equilibrium supported by price p = (p1 ,p2, • • • ) .
We shall only show that ( xt) is in the short-term core of the economy since the proof 
that (x,) is in the short-term core of every n-fold replica of the economy is identical. 
Observe that p · x, = p·w, holds for all t 2 0. Consequently, we have p1 · x6 = 
p1 · w6 and p' · xl + p'+l · x;+1 = p' · wi + p<+1 · wi+1 for each t 2 1. Since
xj_1 + xj = wj_1 + wi, it follows by induction that
(2) 
hold for all t. 
For each k 2 1, let Qk be the projection of E1 X E2 X E3 X 
• · · onto the first 
k coordinates, i.e., 
Note that Qk(x,) = Qk(w,) = 0 for t > k. Also, by (2) it follows that
p·Qk(x,) = p·Qk(w,) for all t. (3) 
Now suppose that (x,) is not in the short-term core of the economy. Then, 
there exist a coalition S and an assignment {y,: t E S}  such that 
a) LtEsYt = LtESw,;
b) Yt = x, for all but a finite number oft ES;
c) Yt tt x, for all t ES; and
d) Yt >-t x, for at least one t E S.
Consider the case when the coalition S has a finite number of agents. In this
case, it follows from (a) that 
However, since Yt >-t x, holds for some t ES, we must have p · y, > p · x, for some
t E S, and so LtES p · y t > LtES p·w, also must hold, which is a contradiction.
Now suppose that the coalition S has an infinite number of agents. In this case, 
there exists an integer k 2 1 such that Yt = x, for all t E S greater than or equal 
to k. Note that Qk(Yt) = 0 holds for all t > k. Let S1 = {t ES: t < k} and 
S2 = {t ES: t 2 k}. Clearly, S = S1 U S2 and using (a) and (b) , we see that
L Xt + L Yt = L Wt + L Wt.
Now observe that 
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Qk(xk)+ LYt=Qk(Lxt)+Qk(LYt) 
tES1 tES2 tES1 
= Qk(L Xt + L Yt) 
tES2 tES1 
= Qk("L w, + 2: w,) 
tES2 tES1 
= Qk(L Wt)+ Qk(L Wt) 
tES2 tES1 
=Qk( wk)+ l:wt. 
tES1 
Applying the price p, yields
p·Qk(xk) + p· (L Yt) = p·Qk(wk) + p·(L w,), 
tES1 tES1 
which, in view of (3), implies that 
But Yt >-t Xt holds for some t < k and thus, we must have
which is a contradiction. This contradiction shows that (x,) is in the short-term core
of the OLG economy. Ill 
5. THE PROPER OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL
The objective of this section is to establish a version of a core equivalence the­
orem for overlapping generations models with proper preferences by applying the 
results of the previous section. The commodity-price duality at each period t will 
be described by a Riesz dual system (E,, E;). Then, a price in this overlapping 
generations model is a sequence p = (p1 ,p2, • • • ) with each pt E E;. Thus, we will
be considering the overlapping generations model having Riesz dual system (E, E'). 
Notice that 0 is an ideal of E. 
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Next we establish a core equivalence theorem for the OLG model having Riesz 
dual system (E, E'). To accomplish this, we shall invoke the notion of uniform 
properness. Proper preferences were introduced by A. Mas-Colell [17]. Let us say 
that the preference t:, induced by u, is uniformly proper whenever there exist lo­
cally convex-solid topologies on E, and Et+l consistent with the dualities (E,, E;) 
and (Et+1,E;+1) such that each tt is uniformly proper with respect to the prod­
uct topology on E, x Et+l· The preference t:o is uniformly proper whenever it is
uniformly proper on E1. Also, let us say that the overlapping generations model is 
proper whenever 
a) Each preference t: t ( t = 0, 1, 2, . . .  ) is uniformly proper; and
b) The total endowment B, = w:_1 + w; present at period t is a strictly positive
element of E, for each t 2': 1. (Recall that B, is strictly positive whenever q·B, > 0
holds for all 0 < q EE;.)
For proper overlapping generations models a Walrasian equilibrium can be char­
acterized as follows. 
Theorem 5.1. An allocation in a proper overlapping generations model is a Wal­
rasian equilibrium with respect to the Riesz dual system (E, E') if and only if it 
belongs to the short-term core of every n-fold replica of the OLG economy. 
Proof. Let (x,) be an allocation that belongs to the short-term core of every replica 
of the economy. By Theorem 4.2 there exists a price p = (p1, p2, . • .  ) E E>' supporting 
(x,) on E> and satisfying p ·w, > 0 for t = 0, 1, 2 ,  . . . . We have p' E 8� for each t.
Now by a Theorem of N. C. Yannelis and W. R. Zame [22]  (see also [3, Theo­
rem 9.2]) each linear functional p': e, --> R is continuous. Since e, is dense in E,, 
it follows that p' has a continuous extension qt to all of E,. Thus, p* = (q1, q2, ... ) E
E', and we claim that p* supports (xt) . 
To see this, let y tt Xt in Et X E;1+1. Fix fi > 0 and note that y + fiw, >-t x,. 
Now each 8; is dense in E; for a locally convex-solid topology. In particular, the 
ideal e, x 8t+1 is dense in Et x Et+i · Thus, there exists a net { y"} <;:: et x et+i 
that converges topologically to y + fiw,. In view of y + fiwt >-t Xt and the continuity 
of Ut, we can assume that y" >-t x, holds for all a. Thus, by the supportability of p 
on El, we get p · y" 2': p ·Wt for all a, and by the continuity of p * on E, x Et+ 1, we see 
that p* · y + fip* ·Wt 2': p* ·Wt for all fi > 0. Therefore, y tt x, in Et x E;1+1 implies
p* · y 2': p* · w,, which shows that the price p* E E' supports the allocation (xt) .
Therefore, (x t) is a Walrasian equilibrium with respect to the Riesz dual system 
(E, E'). II 
It should be observed that if each commodity space is finite dimensional, then 
a continuous utility function is automatically uniformly proper. Thus, the above 
theorem shows that in a classical overlapping generations model an allocation is a 
Walrasian equilibrium if and only if it belongs to the short-term core of every n-fold 
replica of tlie OLG economy. 
Next, we shall show that the set of Walrasian equilibria consists exactly of those 
allocations which are Walrasian equilibria in the short-term. At-short-term economy 
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is a finite period economy obtained by truncating the original economy in such a way 
that a Walrasian equilibrium in the OLG model becomes a Walrasian equilibrium in 
each truncated economy. 
Let (x,) be a fixed allocation in the OLG model. Then in the truncated econ­
omy, we desire (xo, x1, ... ,x,) to be an allocation. In the truncated economy, we 
wish for the last generation to preserve the aggregate endowment. However, it may 
happen that I;� x; fo I;� w;. Thus, when the original economy is truncated, the
characteristics of the consumer for the last period must be modified. Each agent 
has the same initial endowments and preferences as before except the last agent has 
"'' "''- 1 h" . . . 1 d t Do Xi 
- wo Wi as 1s 1n1t1a en owmen . 
A t-short-term economy is defined to be the t-period economy where each con­
sumer has the same preferences and initial endowments as originally and the char­
acteristics of agent t is modified to have I;� x; - I;�-l w; as his initial endowment.
Note that at-short-term economy is an economy with a finite number of consumers 
that is constructed in such a way that if (xt) is a Walrasian equilibrium in the OLG
model, then (x0, x1, ... , x,) is a Walrasian equilibrium in the t-short-term economy. 
An allocation (x,) is said to be a short-term Walrasian equilibrium if the al­
location ( x0, x1, ... , x,) is a Walrasian equilibrium for each t-short-term economy.
Clearly, any Walrasian equilibrium in the OLG model is a short-term Walrasian 
equilibrium. Also, a short-term Walrasian equilibrium is in the short-term core of 
every replica of the economy. This can be easily shown by modifying the proof of 
Lemma 4 .9 .  These observations when combined with Theorem 5.1 give the following
characterization of Walrasian equilibria in the OLG model. 
Theorem 5.2. An allocation in a proper overlapping generations model is a Wal­
rasian equilibrium if and only if it is a short-term Walrasian equilibrium. 
Finally, we remark that our techniques (with some obvious modifications) show 
that Theorems 4 .2 and 5.1 are, in fact, true for the general overlapping generations
model. That is, Theorems 4 .2 and 5.1 are true for an overlapping generations model
where 
1) r persons are born in each time period, and
2) each person lives I! periods.
17 
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